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ACL 2024 Tutorial:

# Vulnerabilities of Large Language Models to Adversarial Attacks

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Quazi Mishkatul Alam, Haz Sameen Shahgir, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh, Yue Dong

https://llm-vulnerability.github.io/

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**Content Warning: For Research Purpose Only**

# Contributors & Presenters

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# Participation and QA

**All tutorial slides and reading lists are available at:**

https://llm-vulnerability.github.io/

**We will provide live Q & A on sli.do:**

https://tinyurl.com/llm-vulnerabilities-tutorial

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# Adversarial Attacks

Inputs that appear normal to humans but cause neural networks to *misbehave*.

: **Panda**

+



Adversarial Noise

=

: **Gibbon**

Appears to be a fundamental vulnerability of neural networks that has not been addressed even after a decade of study.

# Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models

**LLM Misbehaviors**




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# Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models

**LLM Misbehaviors Preventing Harmful Context Generation:**




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# Jailbreaking In LLMs




**Jailbreaking:**

Safety Training is the proverbial “jail” and we wish to find methods that “break” this jail and cause the LLM to answer freely.

# Threat Models and Attack Vectors

**Threat Models:**

1. White-box / Full Access Attack knows the exact implementation of the victim.
2. Grey-box / Partial Access
3. Black-box / IO Access

**Attack Vectors for Large Language Models:**

Text (+Weights, Gradients, Activations)

# Adversarial Attacks on Vision Language Models

**VLM Misbehavior**




**Harmful Content Generation**

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# Adversarial Attacks on Vision Language Models

**VLM Misbehavior**



An image of a *panda* perturbed such that Vision Models mislabel it as a **Molotov**. (Ilyas et al. 2019)

VLM

*"First, you need gasoline ..."*

*"How to make the object in the image?"*

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# Threat Models and Attack Vectors

**Threat Models:**

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**Attack Vectors for Large Language Models:**

Text (+Weights, Gradients, Activations)

**Attack Vectors for Vision Language Models:**

Text , **Image** (+ ... )

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# Adversarial Attacks on Vision Language Models

Vision capabilities increase input space.

**Text Input Space**:

$$|Tokens| * |Vocabulary| = n|V|$$

**Multimodal Input Space**

$$|Tokens| * |Vocabulary| + Height * Width * Channels * Range$$

For a 224x224 RGB image, the search space expands ~13 times!



# Multi-Modal Capabilities vs. Safety Training Generalization

**Input Embedding Space Expansion**

**Safety Training**

Safety training remains in the textual domain (text datasets) and is performed only on the LLM.

**Generalization Mismatch**




Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models (Shayegani et al. 2024.)

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# Why Study Adversarial Attacks?




Can’t we simply google it?

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# Why Study Adversarial Attacks?

Adversarial attacks are not really about information extraction.

It aims to push the LLM towards malign behaviors which include:

1. Revealing harmful information
2. **Adopting harmful conversation tones (i.e. encouraging self harm)**




Zou et al. 2023

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# Why Study Adversarial Attacks?

Adversarial attacks are not really about information extraction.

It aims to push the LLM towards malign behaviors which include:

1. Revealing harmful information
2. Adopting harmful conversation tones (i.e. encouraging self harm)
3. **Spreading misinformation or propaganda**




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# Why Study Adversarial Attacks?

As LLMs are applied to a ever-expanding range of applications, so do the number of possible attacks.

**LLM Applications and potential attacks:**

1. Medical LLMs: Reveal patient health records.
2. Code LLMs:Write code with intentional vulnerabilities that can be exploited later.
3. LLMs in HR: Mislabel data and bypass screening.



# Goals of the Tutorial

1. Problem definition
2. Adversarial attack types
3. Cause of LLM vulnerabilities
4. Defenses against attacks

**This tutorial is cutting-edge (most papers are 2023-2024). We present:**

1. Categorization of existing research and how they relate to each other.
2. Current challenges and open problems.

# Schedule

| Time | Section | Presenter |
|---|---|---|
| 9:00—9:10 | Section 1: Introduction - LLM vulnerability [Slides] | Yue |
| 9:10—9:30 | Section 2: Preliminaries - Thinking like a hacker [Slides] | Nael |
| 9:30—9:55 | Section 3: Text-only Attacks [Slides] | Yu, Yue |
| 9:55—10:25 | Section 4-1: Multi-modal Attacks (VLM) [Slides] | Erfan, Yue |
| 10:25—10:30 | Q&A Session I | |
| 10:30—11:00 | Coffee break | |
| 11:00—11:25 | Section 4-2: Multi-modal Attacks (T2I) [Slides] | Sameen |
| 11:25—11:50 | Section 5: Additional Attacks [Slides] | Pedram, Nael |
| 11:50—12:10 | Section 6: Causes [Slides] | Mishkat, Sameen |
| 12:10—12:20 | Section 7: Defenses [Slides] | Mamun, Yue |
| 12:20—12:30 | Q&A Session 2 | |


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# Interested in AI Safety?

## We are recruiting talented PhD students!

Yue Dong

Nael Abu-Ghazaleh

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