



Md Abdullah Al Mamun

3rd Year Ph.D. Student in CS at UC Riverside

Advised by: [Prof. Nael Abu-Ghazaleh](#)

Primary Research Area:

- Generative AI
- Secure AI Systems
- Privacy/Security of ML & LLM
- Federated Learning


Recent Research projects:

- ML models as storage channels and their (mis-)applications
- Bypassing guardrails in LLM




[Website](#)
[LinkedIn](#)
mmamu003@ucr.edu

Roadmap for Defenses




Roadmap for Defenses



Large Language Model Unlearning

Overview




Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning

Large Language Model Unlearning

Overview

- Penalizes the model when it generates responses that are similar to the undesirable outputs



Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning

Large Language Model Unlearning

Methodology

Gradient Ascent (GA)

- Update the model by following the opposite direction of the gradient of the loss function

Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning

Large Language Model Unlearning

Methodology

Gradient Ascent (GA)

- Update the model by following the opposite direction of the gradient of the loss function

Mismatch

- Introduces data that is intentionally unrelated or mismatched with the original prompts

Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning

Large Language Model Unlearning


Results:

Method	Harmful rate on Unseen harmful Prompts (↓)	leak Rate on Unseen Extraction Attempts (↓)	Hallucination rate on Unseen Misleading (In-dist) Question (↓)
original	51.5%	81%	45.5%
Fine Tuning	52.5%	81%	43.5%
GA	1%	0%	8.5%
GA + Mismatch	3%	1%	8.5%

Table 1: Experiment results for Llama-2 (7B)

Defense Category: Training time -> Alignment -> Unlearning

Roadmap for Defenses



Defense: Perplexity (PPL) Based Detection

Metric	Vicuna-7B	Falcon-7B-Inst.	Guanaco-7B	ChatGLM-6B	MPT-7B-Chat
Attack Success Rate	0.79	0.7	0.96	0.04	0.12
PPL Passed (↓)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
PPL Window Passed (↓)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00


Table 2: Both basic perplexity and windowed perplexity easily detect all adversarial prompts generated by the optimizer, while letting all prompts in the AdvBench dataset through.

- Drops benign user queries for many normal instructions from AlpacaEval.

Certifying LLM Safety against Adversarial Prompting

Methodology

- **Erase:** Removes tokens one by one from the original prompt P




Defense Category: Inference time -> Filtering -> Input Preprocessing

Certifying LLM Safety against Adversarial Prompting


Methodology

- **Check:** If any of these sequences are harmful, the original prompt P is identified as harmful.



Defense Category: Inference time -> Filtering -> Input Preprocessing

Roadmap for Defenses



SmoothLLM: A randomized defense






Figure 2: Examples of insert, swap, and patch perturbations (pink)


Methodology



Methodology



Methodology



Methodology




Figure 3: (Left) An undefended LLM (cyan) takes an attacked prompt P as input and returns a response R . (Right) SMOOTHLLM (yellow), which acts as a wrapper around any LLM, comprises a perturbation step (pink), wherein N copies of the input prompt are perturbed, and an aggregation step (green), wherein the outputs corresponding to the perturbed copies are aggregated.

Results

- At $q = 10\%$, the ASR for swap perturbations falls below 1%.





Figure 4: The dashed lines (red) denote the ASRs for suffixes generated by GCG on the AdvBench dataset for Vicuna and LLama2.

Roadmap for Defenses





Thank You!

Q & A

<https://llm-vulnerability.github.io/>